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Objective: To obtain a classification of schemes  
that finance and/or incentivize the provision of ES   
without exclusions 
 
Overview: 
• Cases 
• Direct classifications 
• Transaction cost economics 
• Link to nature related transaction 
• Further steps 
Schemes for the provision of 
hydrological services 
• ESPH-PROCUENCAS, Costa Rica 
• PES Pimampiro, Ecuador 
• Regional Water Fund (FORAGUA), Ecuador 
– Municipality of Celica  
– Municipality of Loja  
• RWA Los Negros, Bolivia 
• Water Fund for Life and Sustainability, Colombia 
• … 
ES provider based classification 
• Contracts versus land purchases  
• PES and non-PES or PES-like 
• Land purchases, investment in ES, not PES (Rojas and 
Aylward, 2003) 
• E.g. PES Pimampiro versus FORAGUA Loja 
 
 
 
ES “Buyer” Based classification 
o Municipalities and municipal water companies 
– FORAGUA Celica 
– Los Negros 
o Private companies 
– ESPH-PROCUENCAS 
o Water user associations 
– Los Negros 
– Water Fund for Life and Sustainability, Colombia 
 
All use a type of environmental charge on water 
Transaction Costs Economics Theory 
• The transaction ‘is the basic unit of analysis ’ 
(Williamson, 1985)  
• Institutions as rules 
• Governance structures as the organizational 
solutions for making rules effective  
    (North 1990) 
• Types of transaction costs 
o Information; 
o Decision making;  
o Enforcement costs 
• Influenced by 
o Asset specificity  
o Uncertainty  
o Frequency  
• Determine the governance form 
– Markets, hybrids and hierarchies 
• Characterized by 
o Contracts law 
o Incentive intensity 
o Administrative control 
 
Transaction Costs Economics Theory 
PES and land purchases in basic TCE 
•PES Pimampiro  
•Water tariff fixed contractual payment 
•Contract between landholders and Pimampiro’s municipal water 
company 
•Monetary incentives  
•Providers monitored for compliance 
•FORAGUA, Loja (land purchases) 
•Water tariff fixed contractual payment 
•External fund management 
•No contract 
•Incentive not external, except legal obligation to invest water 
fund 
•Watershed protection by municipal water company 
•Pimampiro’s PES closer to markets and Loja’s land purchases closer to 
hierarchies (hybrids) 
 
•Frequency: Daily water use/flow, number of water users 
•Uncertainty: Trust in compliance by landholders 
•Asset Specificity: No extra investment in water treatment plant 
 
• “A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface. One stage of 
activity terminates and another begins” (Williamson 1985). 
 
• Different Properties 
• Mobility 
• Separability 
• Complexity (knowledge problem) 
• Difficulties to standardise 
(Hagedorn, 2008) 
 
• Role of governments 
Nature related transactions  
Theoretical Options 
• Revised TCE framework 
• Public Private Partnership                               
(e.g. Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2009) 
– Role of governance costs 
• Integrative and segregative institutions 
(Hagedorn, 2005) 
– How consequences of decisions made by actors 
are dealt with under a set of rules 
Concluding remarks 
• TCE more appropriate to be able to compare 
instead of exclude different mechanisms 
• Focus on all transactions: Human-nature 
related, financial and property right 
transactions 
• Focus on providers and beneficiaries 
• Power relations 
• But…danger of becoming too situation specific 
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